


**Decision Analysis:**

As the owner of a major housing development company, you want to decide if you would stay in the house developing market or sellout your company. If you sold out the business, you are guaranteed a profit of \$1,000,000. Meanwhile, if you stayed in business you must either increase your prices or keep the old prices. Either way, the outcome of your prices will be affected by the government new laws.

There are indicators that the government new laws might affect the housing market. There is a 70% chance the government new laws will increase the market profit and will generate a revenue of \$1,500,000 if you increased your prices, otherwise (the other 30%), you will obtain only \$500,000. Meanwhile, if you did not increase your prices, the new government laws will generate \$1,000,000 with 70% chance, and \$750,000 otherwise.

What would be your decision? Solve this problem using neat diagrams and illustrations. Provide a complete mathematical solution for this problem to determine your solution.




Game Theory: Sequential Games:

G1:

Smith and John are coordinating in a sequential game to maximize their profit of a product that can come in two sizes, big and small. Smith will move first to choose big or small sizes, then John. Payoff is shown in the tree

- Sequential games: (Coordination Game)




- Since John moves last, John will choose high if Smith chooses high (2, 2) and low if Smith chooses low (1, 1)
- Knowing John is rational and will follow the above, Smith will choose high to have more utility.

G2:

The construction development market problem discussed in the class

- Sequential Game: (Market)



- P2 moves last, and will choose high if P1 Enter (82, 82) < strategy called h|E >, or high if P1 chooses to stay out (0, 200) < strategy called h|S >
- P1 knowing that P2 will choose high either way, P1 will maximize the utility by choose Enter

Game Theory: Simultaneous Games

Determine the Dominate Strategy and Nash Equilibrium for each of the following games that Maximizes the players payoffs

G1:

	X	Y
X	2,2	5,1
Y	1,5	3,3

②

	X	Y
X	2,2	5,1
Y	1,5	3,3

Dominante Strategy (D.S):

- Remember that D.S only checks the best strategy for the player.
  - D.S<sub>1</sub> (X) since  $2 > 1$  if P<sub>2</sub> played X, and  $5 > 3$  if P<sub>2</sub> played Y.
  - D.S<sub>2</sub> (X) since  $2 > 1$  if P<sub>1</sub> played X, and  $5 > 3$  if P<sub>1</sub> played Y
- Also Remember that P<sub>1</sub> & P<sub>2</sub> only control their own actions so move down & up if you are P<sub>1</sub> & Left & Right if you are P<sub>2</sub>

D.S = (X, X)  $\rightarrow \pi(2,2)$   
Nash Equilibrium:

- Remember:
  - Best Response
  - No incentive to deviate

	X	Y
X	<u>2,2</u>	5,1
Y	1,5	<u>3,3</u>

For P<sub>1</sub>:  
 if P<sub>2</sub> played X, he best play X to gain 2 instead of 1 for Y  
 if P<sub>2</sub> played Y, he best play X to gain 5 instead of 3 for Y

For P<sub>2</sub>:  
 if P<sub>1</sub> played X, he best play X to gain 2 instead of 1 for Y  
 if P<sub>1</sub> played Y, he best play X to gain 5 instead of 3 for Y

N.E: (X, X)  $\rightarrow \pi(2,2)$

G2

	L	R
U	3,2	0,-1
D	-1,0	2,3

②

	L	R
U	<u>3,2</u>	0,-1
D	-1,0	<u>2,3</u>

①

D.S:  
No dominate strategy of  $P_1$ : U is better than D if  $P_2$  Played L 3 > -1  
but D is better than U if  $P_2$  Played R 2 > 0

Same for  $P_2$

N.E:

$P_1$ : if  $P_2$  played L,  $P_1$  best play U to gain 3 instead of -1  
if  $P_2$  played R,  $P_1$  best play D to gain 2 instead of 0

$P_2$ : if  $P_1$  played U,  $P_2$  best play L to gain 2 instead of -1  
if  $P_1$  played D,  $P_2$  best play R to gain 3 instead of 0

N.E: (U,L)  $\rightarrow \pi(3,2)$   
(D,R)  $\rightarrow \pi(2,3)$

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